General Heinz Guderian: The Father of the Blitzkrieg,Biography of General Heinz Guderian,General Heinz Guderian

                                                         

                                

                      Biography of General Heinz Guderian

In the first two years of World War II the Allies were stunned by the speed, coordination andefficacy of German’s armoured divisions, seemingly unstoppable. It was the success of the Blitzkrieg tactics,the ‘lightning war’. This success was attributed to the leadershipand military genius of today’s protagonist. Even before the war, his published works hadbrought him to the attention of military leaders worldwide. He became known as ‘The Father of Blitzkrieg’. His loyalty to Germany was undisputed, buthis support of Hitler and Nazi leadership was not so clear cut. He was in fact one of the very few Generalswho dared shouting back at the Fuhrer and even disobey his orders. Please join me today for the story of GeneralHeinz Guderian. Some clarifications on Blitzkrieg tacticsBefore we dive bomb like a Stuka into Heinz Guderian’s life, I will bore you with somemilitary theory, as we need to clarify some concepts.

Blitzkrieg tactics can be defined as the useof combined forces of tanks, motorised infantry and artillery, breaking the opponent’s defenceson a narrow front, bypassing pockets of resistance and striking deep into enemy territory. Ground forces are provided close support bythe air force, tasked with bombing key objectives and establishing local air superiority. The term ‘blitzkrieg’, was actually coinedby the British press, not by the German high command, as a means to describe the swiftinvasion of Poland in September 1939. German military would have used the term ‘Bewegungskrieg’,or “War of movement”, and it is a military doctrine, rather than a tactic. A tactic is a method of employing forces incombat, or the ‘how’ you can win a battle. Military doctrine is the set of principlesby which Armed Forces are organised. Doctrine shapes strategies, which are theplans to achieve victory in a war.

 I hope I got that right, if any of you haveserved, or are serving in the military, please feel free to correct me in the comments. But going back to Bewegungskrieg, this doctrinehad been shaping the German armed forces’ plans since WWI. Heinz Guderian and othermilitary theorists after him, perfected the doctrine and took advantage of current technologyto maximise the potential of its theoretical principles. So, rather than calling Guderian ‘the fatherof Blitzkrieg’, he should be ‘the optimiser of Bewegungskrieg’. Not as catchy, I know. But with that out of the way, let’s beginwith the life of Heinz. Heinz(el) and GretelHeinz Guderian was born on the 7th of June, 1888 in Kulm, Prussia, now in Polish territory. He came to life into a close-knit family witha long-standing military tradition. His father, Friedrich, had been a colonelin the Prussian, then German army. Heinz followed his father’s career enthusiasticallyand as teenager enlisted in the Principal Cadet School in Berlin. He was an ambitious and determined student,his teachers described him as 'always serious'Well, not always. Sometimes he was described as'very serious'.

 Heinz soon gained a useful leadership skill,that is the ability of speaking very concisely and clearly to communicate his ideas, andlater his orders. At will, he could turn his communication styleinto one that was cold and hurting. This made him equally famous and feared atCadet School, but not very popular. It appears he made no friends there, at leastuntil he graduated and got his first command post. In 1907, aged 19, Heinz was sent to join theTenth Battalion as 2nd Lieutenant under the command of his father. We don’t know if this was by design, butwe do know that Heinz did not take advantage of the situation to just slouch around. Friedrich Guderian was a stern leader, bothloved and feared by his soldiers and his family, and he would not make any favours to his son. Heinz worked hard and learned a great dealfrom his father. Two years later Heinz Guderian’s unit wastransferred to the Goslar barracks in the Harz Mountains, one of the most scenic partsof Germany. He had some time to go horse riding, huntingand socialising, and so he met and fell in love with Margarete Goerne, whom he nicknamedGretel. Gretel was the perfect companion for Heinz,as she shared and supported his ambitious outlook on life.

They would marry in 1913, and Heinz laterdescribed her as the perfect soldier’s wife: she could be cool and sensible when needed,most of all she was able to calm his husband when seized by frequent fits of anger. Very often in his later life Guderian’shot temper got him into trouble for lashing out at subalterns and superiors alike. On many occasions he had to be saved fromdisciplinary measures by a superior who appreciated his exceptional military ability, despitea poor impulse control. Later in life Guderian took snap decisionsto disobey orders from above. He clearly had a talent for leading, he justcouldn’t be bothered with following. Schnelle HeinzThe year before his wedding, 1912, Heinz wanted to broaden his technical training and so hetransferred to the Third Telegraph Battalion. Here he studied hard to become a specialistin the new radio-signal equipment. Already at this stage, he saw communicationsas a decisive element for military victory. His studies were not limited to radio: hestudied military strategy, French and English, so he could study military theory text booksin those languages. His efforts were noticed, and Heinz was offeredto join a class of 168 officers to attend a three-year program at the War Academy inBerlin.

He was moving fast, so much so that he earnedthe nickname ‘Schnelle Heinz’, or ‘Quick Heinz’. Although he did not see himself as necessarily‘quick’. Heinz did not like to rush mindlessly intoaction, often quoting a line by military leader Helmuth von Moltke:"First reckon, then risk," Heinz Guderian's studies were interruptedwhen two gunshots rang out in Sarajevo on the 28th of June 1914: the assassination ofArchduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary led to the outbreak of World War I in a matterof weeks. With his radio qualification, Guderian joinedthe wireless communication staff. In November of 1914, he was promoted to 1stLieutenant and only one year later to Captain. His work allowed him to witness almost everyfront of the war, including the disaster on the Marne and the slaughter of Verdun. The carnage he viewed may have influencedhis thoughts on developing mechanized warfare to protect the infantrymen and achieve quickvictory. He never had the chance to command a fightingunit, but his radio station sometimes came under attack and he had to fight his way out. As a result, he was awarded the Iron Crosssecond and first class. In early 1918, he was tested at an advancedofficer training programme, where he showed the ability for solving tactical problemswith unusual actions.

This impressed his instructors, which acceptedhis request to join the General Staff of the Army High Command. It is evident how the WWI experiences shapedGuderian’s thoughts on Bewegungskrieg and how to improve it. His post in charge of radio communicationstaught him the importance of the wireless, especially when it came to coordinating themovements of separate across infantry, artillery or cavalry. Although not directly involved, Guderian studiedthe tactics employed by the Stosstruppen, also known as ‘Shock troops’ or ‘Stormtroopers’. These units we usually successful in infiltratingweak spots of enemy trenches to encircle, capture or destroy command centres. But their successes were short-lived becauseof the limitations of, well, just being human. The extent of the advance of shock troopswas limited by how fast and how far they could walk before succumbing to exhaustion. In many cases, capturing a well-stocked Britishor French position would mean failure, as shock troops just sat down to eat. Guderian’s theories proposed to solve theselimits by supporting infantry with mechanized and motorised units.

They would require in turn the integrationand coordination of separate arms at the lowest unit level, in mutually supportive functions. In lay terms – if you have a platoon ofinfantry - 30-50 men - fighting alongside a tank platoon – 4 or 6 tanks – and theysupport each other, it is easier for them to cooperate, rather than having a whole divisionof 15,000 foot soldiers on one side, and a division of tanks on the other. Again, my military friends, correct me ifI am wrong. War of Movement 2.0[TA1]When the war ended in German defeat, the Treaty of Versailles allowed the Country to maintainonly a small army of 100,000 troops, with no tanks nor aircraft. Post-war, Guderian served as an instructor,teaching tactics and military history. It was during these years that he expanded,developed and perfected his take on the ideal War of Movement. He would digest the works on mechanized warfareof British theorists Captain Liddell Hart and Major-General Fuller. He began publishing articles in military journalsand won a reputation for clear thinking on controversial matters. In 1927, he was promoted to the rank of Major. His role was at the head of the Command forall motorized transport units, and he also taught transport tactics at the Berlin militaryacademy. Basically, his units were tasked with logisticsand transport, not actual combat. But this did not prevent him from taking advantageand play around with his trucks. He equipped some of these vehicles with woodenturrets, armed with guns, and he moved them around a training ground as fighting units.

His superiors were not happy and put an endto his experiments. But what he could not learn at home, he wouldlearn abroad. In 1929, Guderian travelled to Sweden, wherehe visited a tank battalion, then to Kazan, Russia. Here he visited a secret tank testing facilityco-developed by the Weimar Republic and the Soviet Government. Probably he met Soviet tank commanders whowould later become his deadly enemies. By 1933, when the National Socialist Partyrose to power, Heinz was Colonel Guderian. Guderian continued with his articles aboutarmoured and motorized warfare and helped with solving technical problems of the firstPanzer specimens. Guderian’ s theories would find fertileground with the Nazis and their rearmament policies. In early 1934, Guderian organised a demonstrationof Panzer tactics for Hitler. He later recalled“The Chancellor was much taken by the speed and precision of movement of our units andsaid repeatedly ‘That’s what I need’!” Hitler was ecstatic and would provide supportto Guderian’ s innovation, even though the two men often clashed in spectacular shoutingmatches. Nazi leadership proceeded to re-install conscription,thus ignoring the treaty of Versailles. Hitler himself authorized another violationof the treaty, that is the creation of three Panzer Divisions. Guderian was made the Commander of the 2ndPanzer Division and shortly after was promoted to Major General, then Lieutenant Generalin charge of the XVI Army-Corps. In 1938 Guderian’s units were the spearhead of the Anschluss with Austria and the invasion of the Sudetenland, the German-speaking regionof Czechoslovakia. These were the years of Appeasement, so theguns on his tanks were still silent.

A few months later, Guderian was promotedto Commander in Chief of all the Fast Troops, or Schnellen Truppen – the perfect job forSchnelle Heinz! He was now in charge for the recruitment,training, tactics and technique of all motorized and armoured units. A great leader and poor follower, now Guderianwould be able to bring the full weight of his studies, doctrine and personality to theGerman Panzer Divisions. He could finally formalise and implement histake on the Bewegungskrieg. Which is: Nr one! Attacks should be led by large concentratednumber of tanks. Tanks should not be dispersed amongst otherunits, like it was common practice in the British and French armies at that time. As Guderian put it:“You hit somebody with your fist and not with your fingers spread”Nr two! The infantry, transported by trucks and half-tracks,should closely follow the tank platoons to support them.

This involves maintaining the logistics train,occupying positions, taking prisoners, neutralising anti-tank weapons. Nr three! Aircraft and artillery are intended to supportboth tanks and infantry, by striking at enemy armour and fortifications from above and fromafar. Nr four! The units involved require a reliable meansof communication. That involves connecting tanks via radio transmittersfor coordinated joint action. To generate public support for the Bewegungskrieg,Guderian wrote and published his first book: ‘Achtung! Panzer!’ That’s how you pronounce it by the way. It’s not just “Achtung, Panzer”. It’s “Achtung!!” “Panzer!!!!”[TA2]The book became a military bestseller, essential reading for any officer. This book cemented Guderian’s reputationas ‘Father of the Blitzkrieg’. Although it should be stressed again thatthese were not original ideas – he simply had perfected and formalised concepts borrowedby German and foreign military strategists. An obscure French officer, a certain CharlesDe Gaulle, was already a proponent of mechanized war of movement in the 1920s, inspired byPolish officer Sikorski. But in the end, what counts is not who theorises,but who puts things into practice. In the book, Guderian summed up this thinking:"Deeds are more important than words.

The goddess of battle will crown only themost daring with laurels." Bewegungskrieg in practiceIn September 1939 Schnelle Heinz was able to put his words into action, during the aggressionof Poland. Guderian was assigned the XIX Corps, consistingof one panzer division and two motorized infantry divisions which he led in an impressive driveagainst Polish defences. But the real revolutionary actions took placeduring the Battle of France in the following year, when the Wehrmacht concentrated theirarmoured division and Luftwaffe at the Schwerpunkt, or “main point of effort,” achieving adecisive breakthrough against the Allies. The original plan for the invasion of Francewas a repeat of the Schlieffen plan used in World War I: a quick attack through Belgiuminto Northern France. But Hitler was not convinced:“You won’t get away with an operation like that twice running”Hitler demanded a new approach, based on secrecy and surprise. The result was Operation Sickle Cut, devisedby General Von Manstein and Guderian.

The idea was to lure French and British forcesinto Belgium and Holland by launching decoy attacks there, while the main thrust wouldbe advancing through the Ardennes forest, considered too thickly wooded for tank operations. The success of this plan depended on concentrationand coordination. The French had more and better tanks thanthe Germans, but their use was ruled by an outdated doctrine: they were thinly dispersedalong the front and few had radios. Von Manstein instead had amassed 7 armoureddivisions at the spearhead of the Ardennes offensive. Guderian, in charge of three divisions, wasordered to cross the River Meuse at Sedan, where the Prussians had defeated NapoleonIII in 1870. The day of the offensive arrived: 10th ofMay 1940. Everything went as planned? Not really. The German divisions in the Low Lands, didmanage to lure and pin down the Allies, but the swift drive through the Ardennes soonturned into a massive traffic jam. Allied aircraft could have easily destroyedthe German column, but the Luftwaffe did its job and protected them from the air.

The traffic cleared and Guderian reached theMeuse one day earlier than planned. On the 13th of May, he had infantry and engineerscross the river in inflatable rafts, so they could neutralize French bunkers and buildpontoon bridges for the tanks. By nightfall, the defenders were routed. The French counterattacked the next morning,but Guderian, leading from the front, had made the snap decision to set up a defensiveline with artillery. High command ordered him to wait for reinforcements,but Guderian disobeyed and pushed ahead. Between May the 15th and 17th, Guderian repulsedarmoured French attacks in Stonne and Montcornet, although it was not easy. Amongst his opponents, Brigadier General Charlesde Gaulle, who almost managed to capture Guderian. As he remembered:“His tanks succeeded in penetrating to within a mile of my advanced headquarters”This was Guderian’s masterpiece, Operation Sickle Cut was a success beyond expectations. This appeared too good to be true to HighCommand, which may explain their later cautioun. By the 24th of May, the bulk of the BritishExpeditionary Force was encircled at Dunkirk.

An easy prey. But General Von Rundstedt, Guderian’s immediatesuperior feared an allied pincer movement and ordered that his panzers stopped 10 milesfrom Dunkirk. Guderian was allowed to proceed only on the26th. By then, the French had strengthened theirdefences around the Dunkirk pocket, allowing for the evacuation of the British. This surely frustrated Guderian. But, overall, his campaign was a success,resulting in French surrender in June. The Revenge of RealityEmboldened by the victories brought on by the War of Movement, Hitler started drawingplans to invade the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa was launched in June1941, and Schnelle Heinz was again to the fore. The campaign was nightmarish. As we now know, the Army units were followedby the SS Einsatzgruppen, specially dedicated to rounding up, deporting and murdering millionsof Jews, Roma and other targeted groups in Soviet territory. Guderian was leading Panzergruppe nr 2, headingtowards Moscow in late 1941.

Had he been involved in such atrocities? Or was he at least aware? Evidence suggests that Guderian was not ananti-Semite. Possibly he knew that Jews and other so-called‘undesirables’ were sent to concentration camps for a life of hardships. And for sure, he knew that his panzers hadbeen built by slave labourers from occupied nations. But it may be that he didn't know about thesystematic killings. Even his wife Gretel, a stronger admirer ofHitler’s than Guderian, later was shocked by learning of the truth behind the camps. Both were convinced that Himmler and the SSwere the only responsible, not Hitler. If he somehow had no knowledge of the deathsquads, Guderian surely had realised by this time that Hitler was not a leader he couldfollow blindly. As the Fuhrer imposed ill-judged decisionson his Generals, Guderian was frustrated by the lack of criticism. As the Russian campaign hardened, he wroteto his wife: “Everybody is scared of the Führer andnobody dares say anything!” As Autumn and Winter set on, Guderian’spanzers stalled in the mud and snow, harassed by an increasingly stiff Russian resistance.

One of his most famous quotes is“There are no desperate situations, there are only desperate people!” And yet the situation would prove desperateeven to him. “We have severely underestimated the Russians,the extent of the country and the treachery of the climate. This is the revenge of reality.” In December of 1941, Guderian defied an orderfrom Hitler to advance on Moscow, and instead pulled back his Panzergruppe 100 miles fromthe capital. This insubordination cost him his job. Hitler forced Guderian to retire, but rewardedhim with a farm in Prussia. Countryside life did not sit well with Guderian,apparently: during this period a pre-existing heart condition worsened. But he had no time to properly recuperate:he was soon to be recalled into service. Back in action[TA3] In 1943 the situation for the Axis was worseningand the military convinced Hitler that Guderian was needed. Hitler agreed and recalled Guderian from retirement,appointing him Inspector General of Panzer forces. This did not appease his temper, though, andhis shouting matches with the Fuhrer resumed. In summer of 1943 he had argued to containSoviet counter-attacks by a strategy of dynamic mobile defence.

This would imply engaging the Red Army ina series of local clashes to defeat them in detail and delay their advance. The strategy was a contradiction of his belovedBewegungskrieg, but it just shows how he had realised that this was not a ‘silver bullet’suitable to all theatres of war. Hitler did not listen to his advice, preferringthe proposal of General Zeitzler: concentrate almost all German armoured divisions in Kursk,to defeat the Soviets in one decisive battle. The Battle of Kursk raged on from the 4thto the 12th of July 1943. It was a close call, with heavy losses onboth sides. But in the end the Soviets prevailed, andfrom then on, the War on the Eastern Front became one of retreats for the Germans. The following year, after yet another suspensionfor insubordination, Guderian was approached by the circle of Colonel Von Stauffenberg,who were plotting to assassinate Hitler. Guderian refused to participate, althoughhe did not report the conspirators, nor he warned the Fuhrer. The failed assassination took place on the20th of July 1944, followed by a purge of military leadership. Ironically, now Guderian was one of the fewremaining leaders that Hitler could trust for the war effort.

 The Fuhrer appointed Guderian as new ArmyChief of Staff. Guderian's main focus now was to defend Germanyfrom the impending Soviet counter-attack and occupation. He knew very well that the war could not bewon but intended to resist as long as possible. The main hindrance to his plans, was the meddlingFuhrer himself. The quick one finally stopsIn March 1945, he was vocally opposing Hitler in Staff meetings. Hitler decided to get rid of Guderian andordered him to take six weeks of sick leave. The order was meant to hurt him, ironicallyit may have saved him. Berlin would be surrounded by the Red Armythe following month, while Heinz and Gretel were in a cardiology hospital in Munich. This is where US forces captured Guderianon the 10th of May 1945. The fifth anniversary of Operation SickleCut. Guderian was sent to Nuremberg, but not putimmediately on trial. The Russians wanted to charge him with warcrimes, but the Western Allies didn't comply. In 1946, Guderian was imprisoned in the POWcamps of Allendorf and Neustadt. During his captivity, Allied military triedto evaluate the extent of his involvement in Nazi war crimes. As he did not cooperate in interrogations,they placed him in confinement with two other Generals, Geyr and Leeb, and wiretapped thecell.

 Even them he kept his cards close to his chest. This is the only conversation in which headmits his support of party policies: Geyr: "Any objective observer will admit thatNational Socialism raised the social status of the worker, and in some respects even hisstandard of living as long as that was possible." Leeb: "This is one of the great achievementsof National Socialism. The excesses of National Socialism were inthe first and final analysis due to the warped personality of the Fuhrer"Guderian: "The fundamental principles were fine."[TA4]It was not enough to charge him and Guderian was released on his 60th birthday[7th of June 1948] In the following years he contributed to theorganisation of the Bundeswehr, the armed forces of West Germany. He returned to writing, drafting his memoirsand more military theory works. His autobiography ‘Panzer Leader’, alsoknown as ‘Memoirs of a soldier’ was published in 1952, becoming an international best seller. Soon after its publication, Guderian's healthfailed. He died in Schwangau bei Fussen on the 14thof May, 1954, the anniversary of his victory on the Meuse. A critical look[TA5]So far I have told you the most widely accepted version of Guderian’s life story, the officialversion for many decades after his death. However in the year 2000s, Guderian’s careerand legacy have come under scrutiny from several historians, such as Russell Hart, Marcel Steinor Pier Paolo Battistelli. These authors claim that Guderian’s militarycapabilities were undeniable, although he greatly exaggerated them through his writings.

Hart for example claims that his victoriesalways came from a position of strength and numerical superiority, never from a positionof weakness. While Battistelli argues that his true geniuswas as author and publicist of his own image as the mastermind behind the blitzkrieg, orbewegungskrieg. It can be argued that being in a positionof strength is a sign of skill, too, as it requires planning and preparation. And that autobiographies naturally tend tobe embellished accounts. Other arguments are more disturbing, though. Guderian always portrayed himself as distancedfrom Nazi excesses, and as a fair combatant. Yet, Marcel Stein writes that Guderian’sunits in Russia actively executed under his orders the infamous ‘Commissar Orders’. This was the summary execution of war prisonerssuspected to be Political Commissars or actively representing Bolshevik ideology. And that, is a war crime that would not havebeen forgiven at the Nuremberg trials. Hart also claims that during the July 1944coup against Hitler, Guderian opportunistically played both sides, ready to join the winnerto get a promotion as Chief of Staff. As acting Chief of Staff, on the 29th of July,Guderian issued an order forcing all officers to become members of the Nazi Party, implyingthat he was closer to Nazi ideology that he would have us believe. I will leave the final judgement to you, inthe comments. Heinz Guderian: a military genius loyal tohis Country, or a self-serving opportunistic Nazi?